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Abstract When do states allow nonstate actors (NSAs) to observe negotiations at
intergovernmental meetings? Previous studies have identified the need for states to close
negotiations when the issues under discussion are sensitive. This paper argues that sen-
sitivity alone cannot adequately explain the dynamic of closing down negotiations to
observers. Questions that have received little attention in the literature include which issues
are considered sensitive and how the decision is made to move the negotiations behind
closed doors. This paper examines the practices of NSA involvement in climate diplomacy
from three analytical perspectives: functional efficiency, political dynamics, and historical
institutionalism. Based on interviews and UNFCCC documents, this paper suggests that to
understand the issue of openness in negotiations, institutional factors and the politics of
NSA involvement need to be better scrutinized. The paper shows that each perspective has
particular advantages when analyzing different dimensions of the negotiations, with
implications of how we understand the role of NSAs in global environmental governance.
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1 Introduction
Nonstate actors (NSAs)1 are a significant feature of the landscape of international diplo-
macy. NSAs are granted access to most major intergovernmental organizations and
increasingly participate in international treaty-making processes (Steffek and Nanz 2008;
Tallberg and Jo¨nsson 2010; Willetts 2000). The importance of NSAs in global governance
discourse is manifested through a growing emphasis on their roles in the academic liter-
ature and policy documents (Okereke et al. 2009; Pattberg and Stripple 2008; Willetts
2000). However, discourses are also maintained and transformed by their practices
(Winther Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). To understand the role of NSAs, we need to
analyze the ways in which they are involved in governance. This article contributes to the
analysis of NSAs by examining the practices of involving or excluding these actors from
intergovernmental meetings in the realm of climate diplomacy.
A focus on practices helps us to assess the conditions for realizing normative claims
about NSAs’ contributions to global governance. There is a prominent discourse on how
increased NSA involvement addresses a democratic deficit in global governance (Scholte
2004; Steffek and Nanz 2008; Tallberg and Uhlin 2011). NSAs, such as international
nongovernmental organizations and grassroots groups, are expected to contribute to a more
pluralized form of global governance (Cerny 2010). However, NSAs’ roles in global
governance are dependent on states granting them a supportive participatory environment.
While much of the literature has focused on the granting of formal accreditation (i.e.,
registration) rights for NSAs to attend intergovernmental proceedings, NSA participation
in intergovernmental affairs can be hampered by various informal practices (Depledge
2005). In particular, states retain the right to hold closed-door meetings as they see fit, even
in some of the most open international organizations, thereby reducing the opportunities
for NSAs to engage in international policy-making.2 This raises the interesting question of
why states choose to hold certain meetings at intergovernmental negotiations in the open,
while other meetings in the same proceedings are held behind closed doors.
1 We use the term ‘‘nonstate actor’’ to refer to any group that is not a sovereign state participating in global
governance, while excluding armed groups. Examples of nonstate actors are nongovernmental organiza-
tions, trade associations, and local governments.
2 While some states include NSA representatives in their delegations, these representatives are often
restricted in what they can say and in the information that they can share. This paper is therefore concerned
only with the participation of NSA representatives not included in official government delegations.
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Previous studies have noted that states prefer to close negotiations when the issues
under discussion are sensitive (Depledge 2005; Raustiala 1997; Stasavage 2004). This
paper, however, argues that the sensitivity explanation alone does not adequately explain
the dynamics of closing negotiations to observers. Questions that have received little
attention in the literature include which issues are considered sensitive by whom, and how
the decision is made to move the negotiations behind closed doors. As a first step in
analyzing these questions, this paper examines explanations in the literature of why certain
negotiations are held in open sessions, while others are closed to NSAs. Our empirical case
examines one of the most open international regimes—the international negotiations on
climate change under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC).
The aim of this paper is thus to analyze the practices through which NSAs accredited to
an intergovernmental meeting are allowed to participate in actual negotiations, which
affects their ability to engage in global governance. Based on observations of UNFCCC
negotiations, interviews with participants, and a review of UNFCCC documents and
secondary material, this paper examines the explanatory value of traditional analyses of
participation. Specifically, it examines the functional efficiency perspective, the political
dynamics perspective, and historical institutionalism. By confronting these theoretical
frameworks with empirical evidence from NSA participation in the UNFCCC, the paper
contributes to a more nuanced understanding of factors affecting NSA participation in
intergovernmental negotiations, while providing a detailed study of the role of NSAs in
climate diplomacy that goes beyond the official rhetoric.
2 Understanding openness in international organizations
Why do states increasingly invite NSAs to participate in the work of intergovernmental
organizations? To many observers of international affairs, patterns of NSA access to
intergovernmental fora have appeared arbitrary and ad hoc (Albin 1999; Betsill 2008;
Susskind 1994). There is now a body of literature, however, that tries to explain this
uneven pattern of access. The dominant perspective maintains that states open up for NSA
participation in intergovernmental organizations when it is functionally efficient (Raustiala
1997; Steffek 2008; Tallberg 2010). This perspective highlights the services that NSAs can
provide to states in the form of resources and skills. States can choose to involve NSAs to
increase their own regulatory powers, as NSA participation ‘‘provides policy advice, helps
monitor commitments and delegations, minimizes ratification risk, and facilitates signaling
between governments and constituents’’ (Raustiala 1997, 720). In sum, this perspective
holds that NSAs are granted the right to participate in intergovernmental fora due to
rational decisions by states based on considerations of functional gain. The functional
efficiency perspective has been used to understand differences in NSA participation across
policy areas and policy phases (see, e.g., Steffek 2010), but less is known about how well it
explains differences of NSA participation within policy phases.
For example, a general view of functional efficiency holds that across the policy cycle,3
states have technical and political incentives to engage NSAs in policy phases such as
agenda-setting and implementation and monitoring phases (where NSAs can provide
3 The policy cycle is here used as an analytical tool to distinguish between different phases of the nego-
tiations. While negotiations may not follow the simplistic path of a policy cycle, the climate change
negotiations are often cyclical in nature (Neeff 2013).
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expertise and resources), but not in the decision-making phase. In fact, it is maintained that
there may be disadvantages in terms of sovereignty costs in allowing NSA participation at
this phase of negotiations (Raustiala 1997; Steffek 2008; Tallberg 2010). However, the
literature is less well placed to answer the empirical puzzle of why not all decision-making
phases of intergovernmental meetings are held behind closed doors. States regularly hold
open meetings even at the decision-making phases. Within an institutional setting (i.e.,
holding the policy context constant), there can be variation in openness of meetings not
only across the policy cycle, but also across issue areas, negotiation stages, and over time if
the negotiations continue from year to year (see Figs. 1 and 2).
The paper argues that this general functional efficiency perspective provides only a
limited answer to explaining patterns of when NSAs are allowed to observe meetings
within one set of negotiations. The failure to explain these variations in openness may
partly stem from a focus on the general motives of states. We must distinguish between
motives and procedures: The functional efficiency approach serves to analyze the former,
but does not suffice in explaining the empirical observations reported here.
We propose that two other theoretical frameworks—variations in functional efficiency
considerations within the negotiations due to political dynamics between states, and the
historical institutionalism approach—provide additional explanatory power. Thus, to
understand the inclusion of NSAs in intergovernmental negotiations, the roles of states as
well as the institutional practice should be considered. Our analytical framework is
accordingly guided by two overarching questions: First, why does nonstate involvement
vary across policy cycles? Second, how do rules of procedure in intergovernmental
organizations influence these decisions? In what follows, we outline the three theoretical
frameworks for understanding variation in meeting openness within a given institutional
setting and reflect on the comparative advantages of each.
2.1 Functional efficiency, political dynamics, and path dependency
Rational choice institutionalism holds that actors have predefined preferences and act to
maximize the realization of those preferences. The functional efficiency explanation,
derived from this theoretical framework, holds that NSA participation is not useful when
states are embroiled in tough negotiations (Jo¨nsson and Tallberg 2010). Here, the focus is
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Fig. 1 Official meetings in the UNFCCC daily program during COP/CMP 2010 and 2011 per weekday.
Open/closed meetings coded from the daily programs of the UNFCCC meetings of COP16/CMP6 (2010) in
Cancu´n and COP17/CMP7 (2011) in Durban. The daily programs provide an indication of the variation in
open/closed meetings during the two week conference
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different stages of negotiations. Hence, states would only accept flexible rules of proce-
dures that allow them to conduct closed negotiations at stages when the functional effi-
ciency of secrecy outweighs the functional efficiency of NSA participation.
A first hypothesis that follows from this perspective is that states act instrumentally and
decide collectively to hold closed meetings when it is deemed functionally efficient for the
process, such as during interstate bargaining. Accordingly, we would expect to find vari-
ation in open/closed meetings depending on the stages in the negotiations, such that
bargaining stages of the decision-making phase are closed but other parts of this phase may
well be open, driven by states’ collective perceptions of sensitivity and functional
efficiency.
However, we argue that this general explanation needs to be nuanced by looking at how
NSAs’ functional efficiency varies within negotiation phases due to political dynamics.
Given that the rules of procedures allow a choice between holding open or closed nego-
tiations, some states may wish to hold open proceedings to score political points in the
presence of the NSA community or to add bargaining strength to their position.
The political dynamics perspective is a subset of the rational choice approach in its
emphasis on calculated behavior (cf. Tallberg 2010, 56). Though it also seeks to under-
stand participation in terms of motives, its focus is on strategic interactions between states
within the institutional context. This perspective follows the functional efficiency expla-
nation in viewing decisions regarding NSA access in terms of cost-benefit analyses, but
differs by emphasizing the political considerations of individual states over more service-
functionality calculations. The political dynamics perspective thus emphasizes states’
strategic considerations relative to other states.
This perspective assumes that the NSA community is not monolithic and that states’
relationships with this community may vary. In an ongoing round of negotiations, states
cannot pick and choose which NSAs to admit to a meeting4; nevertheless, the theoretical
logic remains that certain states rather than others may have more to gain by letting
observers participate in a particular meeting (Tallberg 2010). For example, states may be
perceived to have a relative gain in the negotiation when presenting a proposal if that
proposal has strong NSA backing. Hence, a second hypothesis is that states strategically
seek to influence decisions on open/closed meetings depending on their individual political
preferences on particular issues. According to this perspective, we would expect to find
variation in whether meetings are open or closed depending on the political saliency of the
treated issue.
The functional efficiency and political dynamics perspectives focus on the explicit and
implicit motives for NSA inclusion by states. Our analysis will demonstrate that these
motives cannot fully explain the decisions to hold open or closed meetings; we also need to
analyze the institutional context. To that end, we use historical institutionalism, which
emphasizes the role of path dependency in formal and informal rules and procedures in
structuring behavior.
The approach of historical institutionalism serves two main purposes in political ana-
lysis. First, it underscores the importance of institutions in setting the stage for political
behavior. Second, it is used to understand how rules and norms have evolved over time and
how they may have affected political outcomes (Steinmo 2008). In our analysis, we use
4 The exception is when a state accredits an NSA as part of its delegation, at which point the NSA loses its
formal independence and becomes part of the government delegation, thus assuming a different role in the
negotiations.
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historical institutionalism mainly for the first purpose, as accounting for institutional rules
helps us to understand the practices of open and closed meetings.
According to this approach, the institutional setup in which actors operate influences
their conduct in a less calculated way. State behavior is structured not by predetermined
preferences, as in the rational choice approach, but by routines, norms, and the institutional
context. Formal and informal rules structure the ‘‘menu of choices available’’ (Steinmo
2008, 160). Hence, institutional analyses can foster a greater understanding of how rules of
procedures shape state behavior at certain phases in the negotiations (Fiertos 2011;
Steinmo et al. 1992).
For example, states wishing to restrict NSA participation when they deem issues are
sensitive must relate to the institutional framework. While the rules of procedures for
intergovernmental meetings are often designed to allow considerable flexibility in how
negotiations are conducted, states may not always have clear preferences for open versus
closed meetings or states’ perceptions of sensitivity and functional efficiency in the
negotiations may diverge. Therefore, some negotiations can alternate between being open
or closed, often based on the chair’s initiative without the express consent of all states
(Depledge 2005). In other words, the patterns of open and closed meetings also depend on
existing operating procedures that have been developed over time rather than solely on the
rational choice of states at particular moments in the negotiations. States may well have
had an interest in how the rules and procedures were formed but, as time goes by, they
become harder to change.5
Institutional path dependency therefore restricts state behavior, allowing for only
incremental change rather than sudden procedural shifts (Steinmo 2008). A third
hypothesis is therefore that both formal and informal rules restrict the action space in
which states can advance their interests, as decisions on open/closed negotiations are also
influenced by habits and routines. The pattern of open/closed meetings would therefore
also depend on institutional factors such as the role of the chair in various negotiation
phases.
These propositions will be explored below by examining how the UNFCCC conducts its
meetings. After reviewing the role of NSAs in the international climate change negotia-
tions, the subsequent sections will analyze why certain negotiations are conducted behind
closed doors, while others are held in the open.
3 Nonstate actors in the international climate change negotiations
The international climate change negotiations conducted under the auspices of the UN-
FCCC are often considered an open international regime in terms of allowing a multitude
of NSAs to attend its conferences and of having relatively generous rules for NSAs
concerning access to documentation, making statements, submission of written input, and
consultations with the presiding officers and the Executive Secretary (Depledge 2005). The
Secretariat also has an NGO-liaison section, which can be viewed as a sign of the deep
engagement with NSAs. This relative openness can be attributed to the Convention falling
under the policy field of environmental politics and because the negotiations are conducted
under the UN umbrella (Linne´r and Selin 2013; Morphet 1996; Steffek 2010; Willetts
5 The institutional conditions are often determined through a highly contentious process based on the
political dynamics, but once these conditions have been established, all states must relate to them (Depledge
2005).
Open or closed meetings? 133
123
2000). The fact that the climate change negotiations deal not only with purely environ-
mental issues, but frequently discuss questions of energy, finance, and other issues of high
politics, has not detracted from the application of the public participation provisions of the
Aarhus Convention.6 This testifies to the strong public participation norms in the envi-
ronmental field that guide the UNFCCC’s open access system.
Nevertheless, interactions between states, NSAs, and the UNFCCC Secretariat have at
times been strained, highlighting the importance of going beyond the official rhetoric to
study the actual practices of NSA involvement. The handling of NSAs at the 15th Con-
ference of the Parties (COP) in Copenhagen in 2009 has been described as particularly
damaging (Fisher 2010). After this conference, the issue of observer participation in the
UNFCCC was put on the agenda of the Subsidiary Body of Implementation (SBI).7 At its
32nd session in 2010, the SBI invited states and observer organizations to submit views on
how to enhance the engagement of observer organizations in the UNFCCC process.8 In
total, five submissions were received from Parties (including one on behalf of the EU) and
sixteen from observer organizations.9 In these submissions, both Parties with highly
divergent political agendas and observer groups stressed the value of NSA involvement in
the UNFCCC process and the importance of having participatory and transparent
negotiations.
The USA, for examples, writes that ‘‘it is important that this process be transparent, and
that it allow adequate opportunities for input and exchange of information and views from
observers’’ (FCCC/SBI/2010/MISC.8, 10). Bolivia calls for ‘‘full and effective participa-
tion of observer organizations’’ and advocates, as the default, that all negotiations be held
in open sessions (FCCC/SBI/2010/MISC.8, 5). The Belgian submission on behalf of the
EU also emphasizes the need for transparency, but includes a caveat: It supports the
‘‘maximum of transparency of the UNFCCC process, while preserving its effectiveness’’
(FCCC/SBI/2010/MISC.8, 4). Thus, we can assume that transparency may entail costs and
that there could be trade-offs between transparency and effectiveness.
A complex multilateral process, such as the UNFCCC process, has a range of proce-
dures allowing for flexibility in how the negotiations are conducted. For example, the
process includes multiple negotiating arenas with different degrees of formality and
openness. A range of informal practices has evolved for how these negotiating arenas are to
be used. For instance, besides making official decisions, formal plenary meetings are often
used to issue official statements and can be employed as a platform for states to posture.
Informal arenas, on the other hand, are used to facilitate in-depth discussions and bar-
gaining (Depledge 2005). These informal arenas range from the less informal (e.g., contact
groups) to the more informal (e.g., informal consultations, spin-off groups, and ‘‘informal
informals’’).10 One change in procedures after COP15 was to indicate in the daily program
when closed meetings were scheduled. Looking at two recent climate change conferences
(i.e., COP16 in 2010 and COP17 in 2011), we find great variation in open/closed meetings
across issue areas, stages in the negotiation, and even between the two conferences (Figs. 1
and 2).
6 See for example the UNFCCC keynote speech at MOP 4 of the Aarhus Convention in 2011.




10 For details about the differences between types of informal arenas, see Depledge (2005, 114).
134 N. Nasiritousi, B.-O. Linne´r
123
The circumstances under which the negotiations switch between the different arenas and
what such practices mean for NSAs, however, have received little attention in the litera-
ture. One notable exception is Depledge (2005), who provides an interesting though dis-
jointed account of decisions concerning open/closed negotiations in the UNFCCC. Her
focus is on the functional efficiency of secrecy in sensitive stages of the negotiations. We
argue, however, that the general functional efficiency perspective does not fully account
for which negotiating sessions are considered ‘‘sensitive’’ enough to be closed to observers
and why some negotiations in the decision-making phase are held in open sessions despite
high political stakes. The general functional efficiency perspective is thus limited beyond
explaining the general trend of closed negotiations and cannot account for variation in this
trend.
4 Methods
We explore the three perspectives in more detail by analyzing their strengths and weak-
nesses, drawing on data from interviews, participatory observation, and a review of pri-
mary documents and secondary literature. Primary sources include UNFCCC documents
covering the issue of observer participation from 2010 to 2011 (see reference list).
Observations were made at the climate change negotiations in Bali, Poznan, Copenhagen,
Cancu´n, and Durban (2007–2011) and at two intersessional meetings in Bonn (2011 and
2012). The observations provide an insight into the practice of open/closed negotiations
from an observer (NSA) perspective. The interviewees include the current chair of the SBI,
Tomasz Chruszczow, his predecessor Robert Owen-Jones, former chief negotiators from
India (Surya Sethi), the USA (Harlan Watson), and Sweden (Bo Kjelle´n), negotiators from
Mexico, Denmark, Grenada, Norway, and Bangladesh, as well as seven NSA represen-
tatives from the major observer constituencies.11 An anonymous interviewee in a position
of trust inside the negotiations was also interviewed to verify the information. Interviewees
were selected to reflect the perceptions of different negotiating groups covering different
issue areas. They were identified as actors in key positions with diverse backgrounds and
coming from different regions, with experiences from the negotiation process across a
number of years.12 Two main questions were considered when analyzing the semi-struc-
tured interview material: What are the reasons for wanting to conduct negotiations without
the participation of observer organizations? How can Parties operate to move discussions
to a closed setting? The analysis used data triangulation, comparing statements from the
various interviews and identifying common themes, and then comparing these themes with
observations and with analyses of UNFCCC documents (Yin 2009).
5 Explaining patterns of openness in the climate change negotiations
We find three recurring types of patterns in the data: (1) those underscoring the inter-
governmental nature of negotiations and a preference by states to close meetings at sen-
sitive stages, thus highlighting the functional efficiency of secrecy; (2) those emphasizing
11 Key representatives of the following constituencies were interviewed: environmental, research, business,
trade union, local government, and indigenous peoples’ NGOs.
12 The interviews were conducted by Naghmeh Nasiritousi between May 2011 and May 2012 and were
audio-recorded and transcribed, except for cases where the interviewee asked to remain anonymous.
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the leverage motives and strategic actions of individual states on certain issues; and (3)
those highlighting the rules of procedures, the chairperson’s role, and habit.
5.1 Functional efficiency of secrecy
While NSAs’ contributions to the UNFCCC process are well recognized by both the
Secretariat and state Parties, having transparent proceedings at all stages of the negotia-
tions may entail a cost.13 In particular, the presence of observers who can report to home
constituencies may affect the negotiating tone by, for example, restricting the open
exchange of views and leading to the entrenchment of positions, thereby resulting in more
arguing than bargaining (Stasavage 2004). Several interviewed negotiators noted that while
NSA involvement in international negotiations was important, the nature of intergovern-
mental negotiations means that certain sessions must be held behind closed doors.
Some emphasized the need for secrecy in the ‘‘give and take’’ and ‘‘problem-solving’’
stages of the negotiations, in which states must make compromises. According to the
Norwegian negotiator, there will always be a need for some closed meetings, as ‘‘the horse
trading is often too ugly for the public eye.’’ Otherwise, the risk is that states will posture
rather than deliberate. For example, according to Thomasz Chruszczow, when ‘‘observers
are allowed, the Parties are not really, let’s say, behaving how they should behave con-
structively, getting to the point; sometimes they are just giving long speeches just to
demonstrate their devotion, to present themselves.’’
Others noted the need for closed meetings to facilitate the airing of views and test the
viability of various ideas. This is particularly the case when states do not have clear
positions on a question and therefore require the open exchange of views, according to the
Mexican negotiator. Several stressed that UNFCCC negotiations are an intergovernmental
process and that certain sensitive topics are best discussed behind closed doors. When
asked for examples of such topics, the Mexican negotiator cited financial and budgetary
issues. This is also consistent with our findings presented in Fig. 2, which indicates that
issue areas characterized by quantitative discussions at the COP/CMPs in 2010 and 2011,
such as the Kyoto Protocol, finance, and mitigation targets, were the most likely to be
closed.
This implies that states perceive a cost in granting NSA access to negotiations at
different junctures and therefore prefer to conduct closed negotiations at sensitive stages,
such as when the negotiations require difficult compromises, when frank discussions are
necessary, and when topics with budgetary implications are discussed. At these times,
states perceive that the functional efficiency of secrecy overweighs the functional effi-
ciency of NSA participation. This seems to give the functional efficiency perspective
validity in a few select negotiating stages when the political stakes are high.
It also means that the expected pattern of open agenda-setting phases and closed
decision-making phases is not necessarily correct. Agenda-setting phases can also be
highly sensitive as states fight political battles to include particular items on the agenda
while excluding others. Difficult compromises when setting the agenda can mean that
sessions move behind closed doors before the adoption of the agenda—as seen in the
climate change talks in Bangkok in April 2011 and in Bonn in June 2011. In Bonn, for
example, the SBI agenda was discussed in closed, informal sessions for almost 3 days
before its final adoption.
13 On potential trade-offs between transparency and deliberation, see Bauhr and Nasiritousi (2012),
Dingwerth (2007), and Stasavage (2004).
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In sum, states collectively perceive that the functional efficiency of secrecy outweighs
the functional efficiency of NSA participation in particular stages of the negotiations. Such
sensitive stages can occur over the policy cycle and are not limited to the decision-making
phase, but generally involve stages in which states bargain among themselves. Thus, the
general functional efficiency perspective may explain particular cases in which closed
negotiations are the result of states wanting to keep the discussions out of the public view.
At other times, however, other reasons appear to underlie decisions on closed or open
negotiations.
5.2 Political dynamics and leverage
The interests that NSAs represent are diverse and reflect opinions across the landscape of
climate politics. Parties can therefore find allies—but also opposition—among the various
NSA groups. Because all accredited NSAs attending a conference must be allowed into all
open sessions, states cannot pick and choose among NSA groups to only include groups
that favor their viewpoint. This means that not all Parties will benefit equally from NSA
participation and that some will favor their inclusion in certain sessions as their presence in
the room may strengthen their own position or weaken that of the opposition.
The level of NSA interest in the negotiations differs across issue areas, and their
positions are often clear to Parties. Certain NSA groups are known to follow particular
issues more closely. For example, interviews with NSA representatives indicate that the
business sector follows the issue of international property rights with great interest, while
forestry issues are followed more closely by environmental groups and indigenous orga-
nizations. Therefore, Parties know whether or not NSA participation in a particular session
will benefit them. Because NSAs can put different types of pressure on states, some states
could gain from conducting proceedings in the open, to expose where opposition to a
proposed solution lies. This means that political dynamics can play a role in deciding
whether negotiations should involve NSAs, as Parties can lobby to have particular sessions
open or closed.
According to the interviewees, some states generally prefer to keep NSAs out of
negotiations on principle, while others take a more strategic approach as a way to put
pressure on opposing Parties. The Mexican negotiator, for example, stated that Mexico
pushed for open negotiations as a general rule in COP16, but that some states opposed this.
Other interviewees singled out Saudi Arabia as the country leading the opposition to
greater NSA involvement in the negotiations and noted that some developing countries still
view NSAs with suspicion. This is not surprising, as most NSAs represented in the UN-
FCCC (and many other intergovernmental organizations) are Western-based and Western-
funded and target countries publicly with criticism, which may not be well-received by
countries with closed political systems. Saudi Arabia has been at the receiving end of much
criticism from environmental NGOs and was targeted in an incident at the Bonn inter-
sessional meeting in 2010 which was perceived as particularly offensive.14 Some countries
thus have general political motives for keeping NSAs out of negotiating sessions.
Other countries, however, favor open negotiations as a rule, since they maintain that
their positions are already out in the open and that they have nothing to hide. According to
Robert Owen-Jones, most Western negotiators believe that it is ‘‘easier to do their jobs
when people know where the opposition lies.’’ Similarly, Surya Sethi maintains that the
presence of NSAs is beneficial as ‘‘they keep other people honest.’’ Hence, transparency
14 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-10798108.
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can be used to steer the discussion in a particular direction by relying on the political
influence of NSAs to weaken the opposition. While the chair proposes whether a negoti-
ating session is to be open or closed, Parties can lobby to change the decision if they feel
strongly about NSAs attending the meeting. According to the anonymous interviewee,
opposition to NSAs can come from different Parties at different times and usually
‘‘depends on who wants to safeguard that issue.’’ This is where the political dynamics
perspective plays a role, as the decision to hold open or closed sessions is no longer about
the general services that NSAs can offer states or the outcome of following standard rules
of procedures, but instead results from the strategic calculations of a group of states
seeking leverage in the negotiations.
An example of how Parties can push to open informal consultations on particular issues
was seen at the Bonn intersessional meeting in June 2011. During an open meeting of the
Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG–
LCA), the chair suggested that the negotiations on issues relating to reducing emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD) would be held
in informal consultations. The negotiator from Tuvalu, however, objected to holding closed
REDD negotiations and stressed the importance of the issue to indigenous groups and that
indigenous peoples must be consulted on this matter. While Bolivia agreed with this view,
Papua New Guinea and Cameroon opposed the intervention, citing the lack of NSA rep-
resentativeness and the need to depart from established rules of procedure to question the
validity of Tuvalu’s request. However, Tuvalu appealed to the participatory norm, and it
was finally agreed that some of the REDD negotiations would be held in open sessions.
This exchange illustrates how the political dynamics of the negotiations can give some
countries leverage to push for open meetings against the will of other states. While Tuvalu
used the participatory norm to advocate opening up the REDD negotiations, the fact that
the argument was made only for the REDD sessions implies that a desire for leverage in the
issue was the driving force of the intervention.15
The political dynamics perspective illustrates how the strategic political considerations
of individual states can be a factor in determining whether or not NSAs are granted access
to negotiating sessions across issue areas. According to this perspective, NSAs can be used
by individual states to increase their own leverage or to weaken the arguments of oppo-
nents. This perspective thus accounts for the political game playing between states and
groups of NSAs in the intergovernmental negotiations.
5.3 Historical institutionalism: rules of procedure and the role of the chair
While the rules of procedure in the international climate change negotiations offer flexi-
bility in holding closed or open meetings, some rules also limit the policy choices of states.
This is most evident when considering the conduct of the closing plenaries of the con-
ferences. Since these plenaries must be held in the open, states can seek to delay them
when they have outstanding issues to resolve, but since the conferences must come to a
close, there have been many instances of heated open ‘‘overtime’’ negotiations. The final
plenary of Durban in 2011 is a case in point: Having dragged on for 36 h because of
multiple informal consultations, it offered those who had managed to rebook their journeys
home many intense, highly political exchanges.16
15 Author’s observations.
16 See IISD (2011a, 25).
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Another example of how formal rules limit the ability to restrict NSA participation was
seen in the final hours of COP15, when the pressure was strong to close the negotiating
arena to NSAs (Fisher 2010). Nevertheless, since the plenary shall be open, all NSA
constituencies were allowed access to the final stage of heated discussions in the plenary
through a small number of self-selected representatives.
These examples illustrate how rules of procedures can constrain states from acting
based on predefined preferences in certain negotiation phases. In the above cases, states
may have preferred closed negotiations because of the high political stakes, but were
guided by established operating procedures, whereby key decisions had to be made in the
presence of NSAs. In other words, formal and informal procedures may mean that deci-
sions on open/closed meetings are not always the result of the rational choice of states.
However, rules of procedures can also work to the disadvantage of NSA participation.
While NSAs gained access to contact groups (unless one-third of Parties object) through
decision 18/CP.4 at COP4,17 they do not have access to informal consultations by default.
One difference is that contact groups are often open-ended, which means that they are open
to participation by all Parties, while other informal arenas can consist of smaller groups of
Parties. Time management often means that negotiations are more expeditious in small
settings, as these allow more topics to be covered in parallel. Many informal sessions thus
only involve a few countries and therefore occur without several Parties in the rooms.
Because the number of NSA representatives sometimes exceeds the number of Party
representatives at a conference, a general rule to grant them access to such meetings would
be unmanageable.
This implies that some closed meetings occur not because NSA presence is considered
costly by states but rather because of the habit of negotiating in small groups due to time
and logistical constraints. While efficiency is a concern for states, it is the habit of moving
negotiations from plenary sessions to small-group settings, regardless of whether or not the
issue is sensitive that drives negotiations into informal groups. Agenda pressure was
highlighted by several negotiators as a reason for using informal consultations. According
to the negotiator from Grenada, ‘‘proliferation of topics and limited time means prolifer-
ation of informal groups.’’ Others stressed that many decisions are made in highly informal
settings where there is even selectivity in which Parties can attend, implying that closed
meetings are not necessarily designed to keep NSAs out, but are instead often used to keep
numbers manageable. According to the anonymous interviewee, ‘‘to get an agreement you
need to restrict the number of people in the room’’ and ‘‘drafting is easier in smaller
groups.’’ These deals must then be brought back to formal fora for consensus decision-
making. There are also stock-taking meetings designed to inform other participants
(including NSAs) of what is being discussed in the informal sessions. Some meetings are
therefore held closed not necessarily to keep NSAs out, but due to standard practice for
arriving at deals among key countries.
Moreover, some negotiators and NSA participants noted that the growing number of
observers interested in attending the climate change conferences represents a challenge for
the arrangement of meeting spaces.18 The physical limits of venues mean that the rapid
expansion of NSA participation has required careful planning. Several interviewees con-
sider the intersessional meetings in Bonn as being more open to NSAs because of the
17 See Depledge (2005, 210).
18 The high numbers of NSA participants exceeded the capacity of the venue chosen for COP15. At COP16,
the conference was held in two venues with a 10-minute bus ride separating the side events from the
negotiations.
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smaller number of participants. In other words, an increase in NSA participation could
paradoxically lead to a more restricted environment for NSA engagement.19
Another institutional factor that can affect the level of openness of meetings is the role
of the chair. States may not always have a clear predefined preference for whether a
meeting should be open or closed to NSAs. At other times, there may be disagreement over
whether the meeting should be open or closed. The practice is therefore that the chair of the
session has the power to propose the negotiating arena. While the chair may often share
states’ views on the functional efficiency of NSA participation at different phases of the
negotiations, the role of the chair differs from that of the negotiators, so their views can
diverge.
The chair can propose whether an item will be dealt with in a contact group or an
informal consultation and, according to the anonymous interviewee, whether a meeting is
open or closed can depend on ‘‘whether the chair is open or hostile to observers.’’ The chair
also has the power to open informal consultations to NSAs unless Parties object. However,
several negotiators noted that informal consultations are rarely open to NSAs because it is
not a standard procedure or, in the words of the negotiator from Grenada, ‘‘there must be a
particular rationale to change the default.’’ As standard procedures are difficult to diverge
from, there is a certain path dependency in closed sessions staying closed. Historical
institutionalism can therefore explain why certain negotiations without particularly high
political stakes can be closed to NSA participation.
The role of the chair and the importance of rules were also evident in the more open
COP17 in Durban. In the previous intersessional meeting in Bonn, the SBI recommended
that ‘‘at least the first and the last meetings of the informals may be open to observer
organizations’’ if the agenda item has no contact group (FCCC/SBI/2011/7 para. 167). The
opening up of informal sessions was advocated by the SBI chair, who did not gain the
agreement of all states that, as a general principle, informal consultations should be open to
observers when facilitators deemed that it would not impede the negotiations, but managed
to drive through this important change in the rules for informal sessions.20 The change in
practice was observed in Durban, where NSAs were allowed into many more negotiations
than in the previous COP in Mexico (55 % open in Durban vs. 28 % in Cancu´n; see
Fig. 1).
Historical institutionalism also sheds light on why certain high-profile negotiations
occur in open sessions. The transparency-enhancing role of NSAs may mean that crucial
negotiation stages are better performed in the public eye in order to press states to reach an
agreement. Since the chair has a mandate to conduct successful negotiations, open nego-
tiations may be viewed as a tool to conclude negotiations in some cases. An example of
this could be seen in Kyoto in 1997, when chair Estrada decided to hold the final nego-
tiations in an open session—despite the existence of controversial outstanding issues.21
Instead of trying to resolve the outstanding issues in informal sessions, the chair decided to
take the negotiations back into the plenary. According to Depledge (2005, 135), this
decision reflected Estrada’s wish to ‘‘ensure that there would be maximum pressure on
negotiators to reach agreement, and that, should any Party seek to block consensus, it
would be absolutely clear how and on whose responsibility the Protocol had fallen.’’
19 After COP15, the UNFCCC Secretariat introduced a registration system that restricts the number of
accredited NSA participants in each conference.
20 See IISD (2011b, 3).
21 The open plenary was suspended at one point for the chair to consult with the US delegation in private
(see Depledge 2005, 135).
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Historical institutionalism thus adds to a more elaborated account of why certain
negotiations are held in open sessions, while others are closed to NSA participation. In
particular, it can explain cases of negotiations involving few sensitive issues being closed
to observers, while other negotiations with high political stakes are held in open sessions.
6 Conclusion
The proliferation of NSA involvement in intergovernmental organizations has changed the
face of international cooperation, as NSAs have gained widespread privileges to participate
in previously closed settings. This paper has analyzed the practices under which NSAs are
allowed to participate in actual climate change negotiations. When examining why certain
UNFCCC negotiations are held in open sessions while others are closed to NSA partici-
pation, we found that the dominant functional efficiency perspective focusing on states’
general motives can only account for why some sessions are held behind closed doors.
While states may prefer closed negotiations during sensitive stages of the negotiations,
such as the bargaining stages, we found that formal and informal rules restrict states’ action
space, as decisions on open/closed negotiations are also influenced by standard operating
practices, habits, and routines. In addition, states strategically seek to influence decisions
on open/closed meetings depending on their individual political preferences on particular
issues.
We suggest that the limitations of the general functional efficiency perspective stem
from its lack of consideration of the context-specific institutional rules and procedures that
structure action and its failure to adequately distinguish between different functions that
NSAs can perform. While most of the literature has focused on those NSA functions that
are more or less equally valued by all states, such as providing expertise, we suggest that
some functions, such as lobbying—for example, in terms of advocating particular issues
(e.g., climate justice) or specific policy options (e.g., emissions trading)—can be exploited
to the political advantage of individual states. The Party submissions to the SBI on
observer organizations reveal that states value different NSA functions, indicating that
functionality considerations can be dependent on the political dynamics of the negotia-
tions—a factor often ignored in the literature.
This paper thereby provides a broader basis for understanding why certain negotiating
sessions with high sovereignty costs are held in the presence of NSAs, while other sessions
with low sovereignty costs are closed to observers. We also provide a more nuanced
perspective on the notion that the agenda-setting phases of negotiations are generally open,
while the decision-making phases are closed. Moreover, while acknowledging that par-
ticipatory norms may play a role in driving greater openness, other factors are more likely
to underlie such decisions. The functional efficiency, political dynamics, and historical
institutionalism perspectives together provide a much more detailed picture of how both
motives and procedures together influence how decisions on the type of negotiating arena
are made across stages, policy phases, and issues in the negotiations.
What are the implications for NSA participation in intergovernmental organizations in
general and the UNFCCC in particular? We have demonstrated that the relationship
between states and NSAs in intergovernmental negotiations is complex, going beyond the
portrayal of NSAs as a monolithic group of service providers relevant only to certain
policy phases. Instead, we suggest that states have varying views on the roles of NSAs in
the negotiations and that there is an ongoing process to define their roles in climate
diplomacy (Newell et al. 2012). While states remain at the helm of forming practices
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concerning NSA involvement in intergovernmental processes, the recent change in the
rules of procedures in opening the first and last informal consultations to NSAs illustrates
how practices can change and make more room for NSA involvement.
The choice of whether negotiating sessions should be open or closed has other impli-
cations as well. While a relatively restrictive environment for NSA access does not nec-
essarily mean that NSA representatives are prevented from influencing the negotiations
(Betsill 2008; Hjerpe and Linne´r 2010; Schroeder and Lovell 2012), it does mean that a
large number of closed meetings could skew the influence of NSAs to favor those orga-
nizations with strong resources and large networks. This point was emphasized by several
interviewees, who noted that some types of NSAs were better equipped to follow nego-
tiations occurring behind closed doors, depending, for example, on previous involvement
with the relevant negotiators. Greater restrictions on NSA participation could lead to
unequal participation opportunities depending on resources and the further disenfran-
chisement of particular NSAs (see Fisher and Green 2004). A key challenge is thus to
manage a process in which the enhancement of NSA participation leads to greater NSA
interest in participation, paradoxically resulting in the introduction of new restrictions
(Neeff 2013).
Our analysis has helped distinguish between the motives and procedures shaping state
behavior in closed and open meetings. Future studies of other policy areas are needed to
provide further empirical data and analysis concerning how this plays out in light of the
NSAs’ ‘‘demand for’’ and states’ ‘‘supply of’’ access over time (Steffek 2008). Our study
indicates that to account for decisions regarding NSA participation in negotiating sessions,
we must look not only at sovereignty costs, but at institutional and political factors as well,
since states are faced with various norms, rules, and motives for favoring or opposing the
inclusion of NSAs in intergovernmental negotiations.
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